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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jeffrey Dean Klein appeals from the district court's order denying his 
motion for an extension of time in which to complete 20 days SCILD service, 
which was ordered as a condition of his probation. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After Klein pied guilty to grand theft, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and 
placed Klein on probation for three years. (R., pp.18-19, 33-35, 49-57.) As a 
term of probation, the district court ordered Klein to "serve a term of 20 days to 
be served through the SCILD program at the Bannock County jail to be 
completed no later than 1/22/11 or the Defendant will serve 40 days."1 (R., p.55, 
,r11; see also 3/22/10 Tr., p.37, Ls.7-20.) The court entered its judgment 
imposing the terms of probation on March 26, 2010. (R., p.49.) 
Almost nine months later, on December 14, 2010, Klein filed a motion 
requesting that his time to complete his SCILD days be extended by four 
months, to May 22, 2011. (R., pp.58-59.) As the basis for the motion, Klein 
asserted that he had planned on completing his SCILD time "during the 
Christmas break which is a slow time for his business," but that he had recently 
been placed on limited work duty due to a back injury he sustained at work, and 
the SCILD program would not allow him to work due to the limited duty 
1 As explained by the district court, the SCILD program is "a community work 
service program that is run by the jail." (3/22/10 Tr., 37, Ls.7-11.) 
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instruction. (R., pp.58-59; see also R., pp.60-62 (medical records documenting 
injury and limited duty instruction).) The district court denied the motion without 
a hearing, stating: "Defendant has never reported to do any SCILD days since 
sentencing. He has had plenty of time to complete his SCILD." (R., p.59.) 
On January 5, 2011, Klein filed a motion to reconsider, again asserting 
that he was unable to complete his SCILD time due to his back injury and limited 
duty instruction, and requesting that his time to complete his SCILD days "be 
extended three months from the date he is cleared by" his doctor. (R., pp.63-64; 
see also R., pp.65-71 (attachments to motion).) On January 6, 2011, the district 
court denied the motion to reconsider, explaining: 
This Court reviewed the Spillman data base and determined that 
the Defendant had not completed any SCILD days assessed since 
being placed on felony probation. Based upon the fact that 
Defendant was given ten (10) months to complete 20 days of 
SCILD, w~1ich would have required the completion of two days of 
SCILD per month, the Court denied Defendant's motion of an 
extension of time. Defendant now asks this Court to reconsider 
it[s] previous denial of his request to extend his SCILD days. 
The Court has reviewed all medical documents submitted by 
the defendant indicating he received a back injury around the 
middle of November, 2010 which restricted his ability to complete 
SCILD days. The Court has also considered the fact that the 
Defendant owns his own business and was planning on completing 
his SCILD days over the Christmas break when business is slow. 
At the time of sentencing the Court sentenced the 
Defendant to perform SCILD as opposed to local incarceration 
taking into consideration his job and other circumstances. It was 
made very clear to him that he needed to complete his SCILD 
timely and not procrastinate doing his days. It is clear that the 
Defendant ignored the directive of the Court. He never signed up 
to complete any of his days of SCILD and put off doing them until 
the last two months. This Court finds it impossible to believe that 
Mr. Klein could not find two days out of each month to complete his 
SCILD days. Had Mr. Klein followed this plan and completed two 
2 
days of SCILD per month beginning in April he would have 
completed sixteen (16) days of SCILD by the time he injured his 
back in November. Had he done that this Court would have taken 
a different position in considering whether or not to grant an 
extension of time for his completion of SCILD. 
At this late date Mr. Klein will not be able to complete his 
SCILD days in a timely manner. SCILD is a consequence for his 
conduct in this case. Mr. Klein must be held accountable for his 
actions not only for the underlying crime but also while he is on 
probation. The Court is unwilling to grant an extension for time to 
do SCILD since Mr. Klein did nothing to try and complete his SCILD 
days prior to his back injury. 
(R., pp.72-73.) The court declined to extend the time in which Klein was required 
to complete his SCILD days, but it gave Klein the following options: 
1. The Court will amend the forty (40) day jail sentence to thirty 
(30) days allowing the Defendant a work release of no more 
than 50 hours per week. The Court will not waive work 
release fees. 
2. The Court will allow the Defendant to serve thirty (30) days 
in jail on weekends beginning on February 4, 2011 and 
serve the next 15 consecutive weekends until he has 
completed thirty (30) days in jail. No SCILD will be allowed. 
3. The Defendant can serve twenty days in jail without work 
release or the ability to work SCILD. 
(R., pp.73-74.) 
Klein filed a notice of appeal, timely from both the district court's order 
denying his motion to extend SCILD time and its order denying reconsideration. 
(R., pp.79-81.) He also filed a motion for temporary stay of execution of his 
sentence and an objection to the court's January 6, 2011 decision on his motion 
to reconsider. (R., pp.75-78.) After a hearing, the district court denied the 
motion for stay, but sustained Klein's objection and rescinded its January 6, 
2011 order, which Klein contended had impermissibly modified the conditions of 
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his probation without an evidentiary hearing. (R., pp.93-95; see also 1/24/11 Tr., 
p.9, L.19 - p.10, L.16, p.12, L.16 - p.16, L.10, p.16, L.24 - p.17, L.25.) 
Specifically, the court ruled: 
Although the Court believes it is well within his authority to modify 
probation or the sentence while the Defendant is under supervised 
probation, the Order filed January 6, 2011, is RESCINDED, and the 
requirement of the Defendant to complete SCILD reverts back to 
the language contained in the sentencing order of March 22 [sic], 
2010. Discretion is given to the probation officer as to how to 
proceed with the enforcement of this and all other probation 
conditions imposed by the Court. 
(R., p.94; see also 1/24/11 Tr., p.16, L.24 - p.17, L.25.) 
On January 26, 2011, Klein's probation officer filed a report of violation, 
alleging that Klein had violated the conditions of his probation by failing to 
complete (or even begin) his 20 days of SCILD by January 22, 2011. (R., pp.87-
88.) Klein's probation officer reported: 
The Defendant and I had talked about completing the SCI LD days 
as soon as possible when he was first signed up for probation and 
as he progressed through his probation period. He was always 
saying he would call and make arrangements with the SCILD 
officer but he failed to follow through and would find some excuse 
as to why he had not gotten it done. 
(R., p.87; see also R., p.88 ("The Defendant did not seem motivated to complete 
the SCILD as ordered, always finding an excuse as to why he had not scheduled 
the days with the SCILD officer.").) The court arraigned Klein on the probation 
violation allegation and specifically advised him that a finding of a violation would 
not result in the revocation of probation, but only in the imposition of local jail 
time as stated in the conditions of probation. (2/22/11 Tr., p.8, L.23 - p.11, L.3). 
The court then entered a denial on Klein's behalf and stayed "further 
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proceedings in regard to the probation violation pending a decision from the 
Idaho Supreme Court" on Klein's appeal from the district court's December 15, 
2011 order denying his motion for an extension of time in which to complete his 
SCILD days. (R., pp.98-99; see also 2/22/11 Tr., p.8, L.7 - p.11, L.3.) 
5 
ISSUE 
Klein states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it refused to extend 
Mr. Klein's time by three months to complete the SCILD Program? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue 011 appeal as: 
Has Klein failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
declining to modify the terms of Klein's probation to allow him several additional 
months to complete his SCILD time when Klein had already been given nine 
months to work toward the completion of his SCILD time and failed to make any 
effort to do so, and when denying Klein's request would not result in the 
revocation of probation but would only trigger the alternative probation condition 
that Klein serve 40 days in jail? 
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ARGUMENT 
Klein Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Declining To Modify The Terms Of Klein's Probation To Allow Him Several 
Additional Months To Complete His SCILD Time 
A. Introduction 
Klein argues that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to 
modify the terms of his probation to allow him several additional months to 
complete his SCILD time. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-10.} Klein has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion. The district court perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, acted consistently with applicable legal standards and exercised 
reason in declining to give Klein several additional months to complete the 
SCILD days that, but for Klein's procrastination, could have been completed, or 
at the very least started, before Klein injured his back eight months into his 
probationary period. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to modify the terms of a defendant's probation rests 
within the district court's discretion. I.C. § 20-221; State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 
47, 436 P.2d 709, 713 (1968} (trial court has continuing discretion to modify the 
terms of probation during the probationary period}. When a trial court's 
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a 
multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1} whether the lower court correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the 
bounds of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to 
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower reached its decision by 
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an exercise of reason. State v. Ruperd, 146 Idaho 742, 743, 202 P.3d 1228, 
1289 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P .2d 
1331, 1333 (1989)). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Declining To Modify The 
Terms Of Klein's Probation To Extend By Several Additional Months The 
Time In Which Klein Was Required To Complete His SCILD Service 
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601, a sentencing court has broad discretion in 
fashioning a sentence appropriate to the defendant including imposition of 
probationary terms that are reasonably related to the goals of probation. State v. 
Wardle, 137 Idaho 808, 810, 53 P.3d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. 
Jones, 123 Idaho 315, 318, 847 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Ct. App. 1993)). 'The 
purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated 
under proper control and supervision. Thus, a condition of probation must be 
reasonably related to the purpose of probation, which is rehabilitation." State v. 
Dicksen, _ P.3d _, 2011 WL 1938498 *5 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted). 
"It does not follow, however, that terms of probation must relate solely to 
rehabilitation and must have no collateral relation to any other sentencing goal. 
. . . The underlying question is whether the [probationary] requirement is related 
to the eventual rehabilitation of the offender." State v. Ruess, 118 Idaho 707, 
710, 800 P.2d 103, 106 (Ct. App. 1990). 
After a court has granted probation, the court retains inherent power to 
modify the terms of probation at any time during the probationary period. State 
v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 47, 436 P.2d 709, 713 (1968); see also I.C. § 20-221 
("court may impose and may at any time modify any conditions of probation"); 
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State v. Fleshman, 144 Idaho 772, 774, 171 P.3d 263, 265 (Ct. App. 2007) ("In 
the event that the trial court grants probation, it retains jurisdiction to revoke or 
modify the terms of probation.") (citations omitted). If, through no fault of the 
probationer, a condition of probation becomes impossible to fulfill, the court may 
modify the condition or remove it altogether and, if the condition is fundamental, 
may revoke probation and order execution of the sentence. Oyler, 92 Idaho at 
47, 436 P.2d at 713; State v. Garcia, 124 Idaho 47 4, 475-76, 860 P.2d 677, 678-
79 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Fife, 115 Idaho 879, 881, 771 P.2d 543, 545 (Ct. 
App. 1989). A court does not abuse its discretion by requiring a probationer to 
abide by a condition of probation that is reasonably related to the ultimate goal of 
rehabilitation, and to which the probationer initially agreed, as long as the 
condition would be possible to fulfill but for the probationer's unwillingness to 
comply. State v. Davis, 107 Idaho 214, 217-18, 687 P.2d 998, 1000-01 (Ct. App. 
1984 ). 
When the district court suspended Klein's sentence and placed him on 
probation in March 2010, Klein agreed to several probationary terms, including 
that he serve 20 days of SCILD "to be completed no later than 1/22/11" or, 
alternatively, that he serve 40 days in jail. (R., p.55 ,-f11; see also 3/22/10 Tr., 
p.30, Ls.17-24, p.37, Ls.7-22.) Nine months later, and just five weeks before 
Klein was supposed to have completed his SCILD service, Klein moved for a 
four-month extension of time in which to complete his SCILD days, asserting he 
was unable to participate in the SCILD program due to a recent back injury. (R., 
pp.58-62; see also R., pp.63-71 (motion to reconsider and attachments).) The 
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district court denied Klein's motion, and his subsequent motion to reconsider, 
reasoning that Klein had been given "plenty of time to complete" and/or start his 
SCILD days since being placed on probation in March 2010. (R., pp.59, 72-74.) 
Klein now argues that the district court abused its discretion in declining to 
modify the terms of his probation to extend by several additional months the time 
in which he was required to complete his SCILD service, contending both that 
the condition was impossible to fulfill and that it was not fundamental to his 
rehabilitation. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-10.) Both of these assertions lack merit. 
Klein cites his back injury as support for his argument that he "could not 
fulfill the requirement that he complete the SCILD program by January 22, 2011." 
(Appellant's brief, p.8 (citing R., pp.58-62, 63-71).) As found by the district court, 
however, the only reason it became impossible for Klein to complete his SCILD 
service within the required time frame was because he failed to take any steps in 
the eight months before he injured his back to work toward the completion of his 
SCILD time. (See R., pp.59, 72-73; see also R., pp.87-88 (probation officer 
reporting that Klein never made arrangements with SCILD officer to do his 
SCILD time and always offered excuses for failure to do so).) The district court 
gave Klein 10 months to complete 20 days of SCILD and advised Klein when it 
imposed the condition that it was giving Klein that much time in consideration of 
the fact that Klein was self-employed but, if Klein did not "get it done by then, [he 
would] be facing forty days in jail." (3/22/10 Tr., p.37, Ls.7-18.) The condition 
that Klein complete 20 days of SCILD in 10 months was certainly not impossible 
when it was imposed. Had Klein heeded the court's implicit warning and his 
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probation officer's explicit direction to "complet[e] the SCILD days as soon as 
possible" (R., p.87), Klein could have easily completed or, at the very least, 
gotten a good start on the completion of his SCILD service before injuring his 
back in November 2010. That completion of the 20 days SCILD service by 
January 22, 2011, became impossible due to Klein's own procrastination and the 
timing of his back injury did not require the court to modify that condition of 
Klein's probation. See Garcia, 124 Idaho at 475, 860 P.2d at 678 (recognizing 
trial court's discretion to modify term of probation when compliance therewith 
"becomes impossible through no fault of the probationer') (emphasis added); 
Davis, 107 Idaho at 217-18, 687 P.2d at 1000-01 (distinguishing between 
unwillingness and inability to perform conditions of probation). 
Even if Klein's inability to complete his SCILD service in a timely fashion 
had not been due in large part to his own procrastination, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Klein's motion for an extension of time. Klein 
agreed when he accepted probation to complete 20 days SCILD service no later 
than January 22, 2011, or serve 40 days in jail. (R., p.55, ,T11; 3/22/10 Tr., p.37, 
Ls.7-20.) While Klein's back injury may have prevented him from serving 20 
days SCILD by January 22, 2011, it did not render impossible the alternative 
condition of probation that he serve 40 days in jail (in lieu of completing the 
SCILD service in the time prescribed). In an exercise of leniency, the court was 
willing to modify the conditions of Klein's probation to reduce the amount of jail 
time Klein would be required to serve in lieu of SCILD, but Klein rejected the 
court's proposal. (R., pp.73-74, 77-78, 93-95.) That the court did not acquiesce 
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to Klein's request for additional time to complete SCILD in lieu of the jail time 
specifically contemplated by the probation agreement does not establish an 
abuse of discretion. 
Klein argues that the condition that he complete 20 days SCILD by 
January 22, 2011, was not fundamental to his rehabilitation and, as such, the 
district court abused its discretion by declining to extend by several additional 
months his time to complete his SCILD service. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) 
Klein is incorrect for two reasons. First, Klein has failed to cite any authority for 
the proposition that, unless a condition is "fundamental," the court must modify 
the condition upon request of the probationer. Klein agreed to the condition 
when it was imposed, including that portion of the condition which contemplated 
that, if Klein was unable or unwilling to complete 20 days SCILD by January 22, 
2011, Klein would serve 40 days in jail. While Klein may have preferred that the 
district court allow him additional time to complete his SCILD service, he has 
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by declining to do so. 
Second, contrary to Klein's assertions on appeal, a review of the record 
and the applicable law shows that the condition at issue was fundamental to 
Klein's rehabilitation. As previously explained, conditions of probation must 
relate to the eventual rehabilitation of the offender and may also relate to other 
sentencing goals, including the protection of society, deterrence and retribution. 
E.:.fl, Ruess, 118 Idaho at 710, 800 P.2d at 106. As noted by the district court 
both at sentencing and in its order denying Klein's motion for reconsideration, the 
condition of Klein's probation that he serve 20 days SCILD was a consequence 
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of Klein's guilty plea to grand theft. (3/22/10 Tr., p.37, Ls.18-20; R., p.73.) Klein 
stole a diamond wedding ring from his roommate and pawned it for gas money. 
(2/4/10 Tr., p.19, L.22 - p.21, L.4; PSI, pp.2-3.) He had previously been 
convicted of and served prison time for theft of property and issuing checks on a 
closed account. (PSI, p.4.) Even if imposed primarily as punishment and/or to 
deter Klein from committing similar crimes in the future, the condition of Klein's 
probation that he serve 20 days SCILD by January 22, 2011, or, alternatively, 
that he serve 40 days in jail, was also fundamental to Klein's ultimate 
rehabilitation because it required Klein both to accept the consequences of his 
criminal behavior and to be "accountable for his actions not only for the 
underlying crime but also while he is on probation." (R., p.73.) Because the 
condition was fundamental to Klein's rehabilitation, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in declining to modify it. 
The district court perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the 
bounds of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and 
exercised reason in denying Klein's motion to modify the conditions of his 
probation to extend by several additional months the time in which he was 
required to complete his SCILD service. Klein has failed to establish an abuse of 
discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order denying Klein's motion for an extension of time in which to complete the 20 
days SCILD service that was ordered as a condition of Klein's probation. 
DATED this 10th day of January 2012. 
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